The Hill Times presents the first of an eight-part series entitled “The Whistleblowers.”  We wanted to find out from some of the country’s best-known government whistleblowers if their actions have actually made a difference to government policy today and if, given the personal costs to their lives, would they do it all over again.

In 2005, Ian Bron blew the whistle on alleged corruption and failure to enforce regulations adequately at Transport Canada’s marine security transportation. It nearly destroyed his life.

Chief of Transport Canada’s marine transportation security regulatory affairs at the time, Mr. Bron, 48, said his life was turned upside down after speaking out against what he alleged were corrupt policy and regulation-making practices.

“It’s had major impacts on my mental health, my career is derailed, I’m basically looking at rebuilding my life on both a personal and professional level,” he recently told The Hill Times.

Mr. Bron joined Transport Canada in 2003 as a marine analyst and said he was promoted quickly—four times in two years—and became chief of security regulations in November 2004. Before his promotion, however, he said he began noticing issues with abusive management and violations of Treasury Board policies on ethics and regulatory development.

Mr. Bron said that employees would raise harassment problems with him, and complained about “petty corruption, things like expensive dinners paid for by industry executives,” as well as bringing attention to enforcement problems on the ground.

“I had a staff of two and a number of others in the unit also looked to me for leadership when it came to management issues. The decision-making was irrational and harassment was being done in the open, and it seemed that I was the only one willing to listen. We had a meeting and agreed on a way to bring issues forward, but didn’t realize how strongly management would react against us, and how much freedom they would have to do so.” Mr. Bron said, “One colleague, who raised issues even before I did, effectively became an agitator reporting to management at one point. It was a complete betrayal.”

In 2006, he was working on a file to figure out the size of scissors allowed to be taken on planes at a time when security was heightened after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. He said there was very little study on what the regulations would mean for Canadians and there was no significant input from all stakeholders, describing policy and regulation-making as a “dog and pony show.” In the end, management decided to harmonize its policies with the U.S.

Lawrence Cannon was the transport minister at the time.

“Our minister was having a meeting with the U.S. counterpart and it would be a great announceable. We went ahead with this, didn’t tell the unions,” Mr. Bron said. “Unions were furious because it’s their workers on the airplanes. I thought they should tell them, but management knew they couldn’t because they [unions] would’ve put up roadblocks right away. Then liquids and gels came up. We went along with the U.S. Nobody bothered to do a scientific study. This is security theatre.”

On the enforcement side, Mr. Bron said he received several complaints from people, “saying, ‘Look, there’s a real problem here. We’ve got ships coming into our waters that are carrying dangerous cargo and not obeying the regulations and we’re being chastised for attempting to enforce regulations.’”

At first, Mr. Bron said, he tried to discuss the issues with his superiors but instead of addressing the problems, it began a workplace conflict with his boss. He said he was forced to move to another part of the department—six months he called “purgatory”—and was left to work by himself.

“They gave me the proverbial little desk in the corner, with no one around,” he told The Hill Times. “I kept my position and, after I sort of did my time, they started to reintegrate me back onto the team,” Mr. Bron said. “They had so few qualified people willing to work on the team, I think. I was really happy in this new position, because it wasn’t the same level of responsibility I had had. I kept trying to have the problems addressed, and they just viewed this as me being spiteful.”

Mr. Bron said he thought policy-making processes threatened Canada’s security because they created gaps in the security framework, which could be exploited, and they weren’t focused on a process of constant improvement, which allowed the gaps to remain.

“They made enforcement difficult or impossible, allowing unscrupulous operators of vessels and facilities to cut corners and open up even more gaps. It’s important to note that TC has a role promoting both safety/security and efficiency, which typically are in opposition. Historically, TC has consistently favoured efficiency over safety/security,” he said.

He decided to leave the department and found a job at Public Works. Before leaving on Dec. 12, 2006, however, he wrote a report on his concerns and sent it to the deputy minister and minister the day he left. He said that senior management went into a week of meetings to discuss the situation, and instead of emerging with a plan to address the concerns, they decided to launch an investigation into whether Mr. Bron had committed a security breach. It was later found that the documents he had released were not a security breach.

“It’s a classic perversion of what harassment policies are supposed to be about. One of them threatened to sue me also for defamation. If I had known then what I know now, I would’ve just said, ‘Yes please, let’s just go to court because they really don’t want anything to come out,’ ” he said. “So, this carried on and I was getting weekly threatening letters at home and at my new job. They called up my new boss and said, ‘He’s done this, this, and this and we’re investigating him, all sorts of privacy breaches going on.’ Eventually, I had to go on stress leave.”

Mr. Bron said they argued he had disseminated secret materials outside the department, which he hadn’t. The department’s own internal review later cleared him.

“It’s a typical allegation made against whistleblowers, and I’m actually surprised they didn’t push it harder. Instead, they pursued the harassment angle, arguing I had harassed my superiors in making the report,” Mr. Bron said.

Mr. Bron, a former member of the Armed Forces for more than eight years and reserves for two years, he also suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which he developed after his military service.

“Imagine being put into an environment where you’re facing this wall of hostility. The only way I could fight back was by suing them,” he said. “I couldn’t work, and had to go on long-term disability.”

Mr. Bron sued the government for conspiracy to injure in September 2007.

In a statement of defence, Justice Department lawyers denied all Mr. Bron’s allegations and said that he was not a whistleblower.

“The essential character of the plaintiff’s allegations in the statement of claim are about alleged wrongs that have been perpetuated against him personally and not about institutional wrongdoing that have a public interest component,” the claim says. “The plaintiff has embarked on an escalating campaign of making ever more serious retrospective allegations of wrongdoing.”

In response to the report that Mr. Bron wrote, the department in its statement said, “The plaintiff made serious allegations of mismanagement, misconduct and harassment; none of which are admitted, all of which are denied.”

Additionally, the department denied Mr. Bron’s concerns that the policy-making process threatened Canada’s security.

“The defendants deny that there are ‘serious security concerns,’ such that Canadians, the economy and environment are at risk. In fact, Canada has been consistently recognized as a respected world leader in marine security.”

Mr. Bron lost his case and was ordered to pay approximately $8,000 for the government’s costs. He appealed the decision, which was denied. The case closed in 2010.

In the end, Mr. Bron said of the 31 issues he raised in his original report on regulatory, operational and ethics lapses, six were investigated and eight were addressed.

“I conducted the review you refer to in early 2010. The term ‘addressed’ should perhaps be used loosely, as it doesn’t necessarily mean satisfactorily resolved. Most significantly: the regulatory development process was studied and my concerns were apparently acted on; a review to improve regulatory consistency was started in 2007; regulations for domestic ferries were completed; administrative monetary penalties were put in place (though I don’t believe any fines have ever been assessed); a review to close regulatory gaps was started in 2007; an internal review into workplace conditions was conducted, but failed to fix any problems. Since then, they have also apparently completed the Inspection and Enforcement Manual,” Mr. Bron said.

Transport Canada brought in Deloitte to investigate some of the concerns raised in Mr. Bron’s report and issued its findings in an April 3, 2008 report titled “Review of Complaints Concerning the Marine Transportation Security Framework Program.”  The report was not public, and Mr. Bron received it through an access to information request. The report found that the policy process Mr. Bron identified was not “unreasonable in the circumstances. From the interviews conducted and the data we reviewed, the process was acceptable to the Government of Canada.”

On other issues, such as “failure to address regulatory gaps or meet service standards,” Mr. Bron noted that a working group was established to undertake a comprehensive review of the marine transportation security regulations.

Mr. Bron said Transport Canada’s failure to address in any meaningful way the concerns he raised about safety and enforcement issues has contributed to the entrenchment of a ‘do-nothing’ culture in the department leading to a lack of oversight on things such as rail safety in the recent tragedy at Lac-Mégantic.

“Word from inside Transport is that ‘it’s like watching a bad sitcom,’ with executives scrambling to protect themselves,” he said. “One of my key criticisms in 2006 was that executives knew next to nothing about safety/security management systems and were implementing a system of regulation that was effectively a rubber stamp checklist. Paperwork was being examined, but no inspectors were on the ground doing proper tests of the systems to make sure they worked. Sound familiar?”

Last July, 47 people in Lac-Mégantic, Que., were killed after a train carrying 72 DOT-111 tanker cars of crude oil derailed and exploded. Canada’s Transportation Safety Board recommended a review of the use of DOT-111 tanker cars; a review of route planning and safer operations for trains carrying dangerous goods in Canada; and a review of emergency response assistance plans along routes where large volumes of liquid hydrocarbons are shipped. Since then, CN and CP announced they would be phasing out older DOT-111 tanker cars.

Last month, Transport Minister Lisa Raitt (Halton, Ont.) also announced changes to improve rail safety in Canada.

Although his speaking out cost him his marriage, his career in the public service and his mental health, Mr. Bron said he would do it again.

“That’s the million-dollar question,” he said. “Fundamentally, from a personal ethics perspective, I couldn’t just sit by and watch things happen.”

He said he would do it differently, however.

“Doing it differently means if you’re going to blow the whistle you first have to understand the organization you’re in and you have to be fully honest with yourself about the kind of reception you’re going to get, about the importance of what you’re blowing the whistle about, about the likelihood of success,” he said. “In my case my whistleblowing had the opposite effect. It entrenched the managers in the department, frankly. They couldn’t discipline them because it would be an admission that something had gone wrong.”

When asked if he had advice to other whistleblowers, he said think about who the best person is to bring up the concerns with. In his case, he said there were very few people he could go to, but looking back, he would’ve gone the political route and tried to get it into the hands of an MP or Senator to bring it up publicly so that it could be looked at possibly at a House or Senate committee.

“Probably the most prudent thing for me to have done would’ve been to go to [a Parliamentarian] with my report, sat down with him and said, ‘This is the problem, this is what I’ve seen. Can you take the lead on this for me because I’m just going to end up in trouble,’” he said. “Try to keep your name out of it, and consult your family. Oh my God, consult your family.”

Mr. Bron said the current whistleblowing regime is inadequate to encourage more people in the public service to speak out against wrongdoing. He pointed to recent cases such as Richard Colvin and Sean Bruyea show the culture in government is to protect management.

“The message is clear,” he said. “ ‘We hate whistleblowers and love people who cover it up for us. We will do anything to protect them.’ ”

He called the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner’s Office “window dressing” that public servants do not trust.

“People are basically still keeping their mouths shut. Will it improve under [commissioner Mario] Dion? You know, he’s got cases he’s found wrongdoing on. It’s going to take a lot more than that before people trust it,” he said, noting that there needs to be changes to the culture, not only the laws in place.

“You’ve got to change incentive structures so that the penalty for doing the wrong thing is much higher than the benefits you might get. There’s got to be a fiduciary obligation for executives to report wrongdoing, for example, and if they don’t they should be fired, or there should be a severe penalty,” he said. “That of course means changing laws, putting in a reward system for whistleblowers who come forward, having automatic protections fall into place when somebody comes forward with wrongdoing, reversing the onus of proof in the case of reprisal or mobbing, embedding things that are soft reprisals into collective agreements, into government policies.”

Mr. Bron was on long-term disability from the public service, but was forced to retire for medical reasons on Sept. 1, 2013. He is currently a director with Canadians for Accountability in Ottawa, an organization that helps whistleblowers by providing support and promoting the need to change whistleblowing laws in Canada.

“On the bright side, I’ve met good people and I’m working to help other good people,” he said. “I’m optimistic about the future. I think things will get better for me now. There’s not much more they can do to me.”

 

Q&A with Ian Bron

Did your whistleblowing make any difference to government policy?

“I don’t think so. At the time, I was very naïve about the way government worked, and that loyalty, up the hierarchy, trumps policy in the public interest. So when I blew the whistle, the main focus of the response was to control the damage to the department and the individuals first, and then to make a reprisal. I have perceived no change in policy—which was overly friendly to industry at the expense of public safety and security—or in the way it is made.”

You were chief of security regulations at Transport Canada, but why did people raise harassment issues with you? 

“I had a staff of two and a number of others in the unit also looked to me for leadership when it came to management issues. The decision-making was irrational and harassment was being done in the open, and it seemed that I was the only one willing to listen. We had a meeting and agreed on a way to bring issues forward, but didn’t realize how strongly management would react against us, and how much freedom they would have to do so. One colleague, who raised issues even before I did, effectively became an agitator reporting to management at one point. It was a complete betrayal.”

Why did you think policy-making processes threatened Canada’s security?

“For three reasons: First, they created gaps in the security framework, which could be exploited; second, they weren’t focused on a process of constant improvement, which allowed the gaps to remain; and third, they made enforcement difficult or impossible, allowing unscrupulous operators of vessels and facilities to cut corners and open up even more gaps. It’s important to note that TC has a role promoting safety, security and efficiency—which typically are in opposition. Historically, TC has consistently favoured efficiency over safety/security.”

Why did management think you had breached security when you wrote up the report in 2006?

“They argued that I had disseminated secret materials outside the department, which I hadn’t. Their own internal review cleared me. It’s a typical allegation made against whistleblowers, and I’m actually surprised they didn’t push it harder. Instead they pursued the harassment angle, arguing I had harassed my superiors in making the report.”

In the 31 issues you raised in your original report on regulatory, operational and ethics lapses, six were investigated and eight were addressed? What were the eight addressed? Did this change government policy?

“I conducted the review you refer to in early 2010. The term ‘addressed’ should perhaps be used loosely, as it doesn’t necessarily mean satisfactorily resolved. Most significantly: the regulatory development process was studied and my concerns were apparently acted on. A review to improve regulatory consistency was started in 2007. Regulations for domestic ferries were completed. Administrative monetary penalties were put in place (though I don’t believe any fines have ever been assessed). A review to close regulatory gaps was started in 2007. An internal review into workplace conditions was conducted, but failed to fix any problems. Since then, they have also apparently completed the Inspection and Enforcement Manual. Keep in mind that the regulations came into force in 2004. I haven’t been following the work closely, however.”

Do you not think that Transport Canada is now doing something about safety and regulations after Lac-Mégantic?

“I believe that TC is first and foremost a reactive agency, and so will only address issues when they become a public scandal—as the destruction of Lac-Mégantic was. So they have undoubtedly been working very hard on rail safety and transportation of dangerous goods by rail. However, sources tell me that the other modes of transportation, and other issues are now on the back burner. Of particular concern is aviation safety. Safety Management Systems (SMS) as used in Canada has been widely criticized in its development and implementation in all modes, but especially in aviation. Reports of problems and near misses as a result of poor training and fatigue in air traffic controllers have reached us at C4A, as has corner cutting. The pilot fatigue issue is also still unresolved, with the department resisting changes for many years. So I don’t believe that this burst of energy will be sustained and don’t believe that the organization has a safety culture, which would be necessary to maintain any momentum. Dissenters, crucial to such a culture, are still being ruthlessly attacked.”